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ABSTRACT  
This thesis explores Serbia's relationship with NATO, focusing on two questions: 
How can Serbia and NATO benefit from the Partnership for Peace program?  How can 
Serbia identify its needs for assistance as a consumer of security and also actively 
contribute to regional security under the overarching PfP program?  
Serbia's main problems include: (1) weak civilian control of the military and 
intelligence services, (2) inadequate legal basis and appropriate legislation for effective 
leadership to transform the military and intelligence services, and (3) a deeply troubled 
heritage stemming from the period when Milosevic was in power.  
Serbia's PfP membership can most directly benefit state authorities by providing 
expert support for solving the first two problems. These problems can be resolved with a 
clearly defined security policy and effective mechanisms for implementing it. Serbian 
participation in the NATO PfP program cannot solve the third security issue, because 
NATO's role in regard to war criminals and Kosovo's final status is to support the UN. 
However, PfP membership provides an additional forum for governments to openly 
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During the 2006 NATO summit in Riga, Serbia received an official invitation to 
join the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. On December 14, 2006 Serbian 
President Tadic and Foreign Minister Drashkovic signed the official protocol to join the 
PfP program at NATO headquarters in Brussels. It was the end of a long, painful process 
that began when Serbian government officials first announced in 2000 their desire to join 
NATO PfP program.  
The initial announcement came less than a year after NATO launched an air strike 
against Serbia. The purpose of the 1999 NATO air campaign was to stop the biggest 
ethnic cleansing in Europe since World War II.  The policy of the Milosevic regime 
forced, in a very violent manner, between 300,000 and 500,000 mainly Albanian refugees 
to leave the Kosovo province in the south of the former Yugoslavia.1 At the same time, 
some 150,000 Serbian citizens in Kosovo, with hopes for a better life, escaped from the 
province to the southern part of Serbia and Montenegro.  
Following NATO's 78 day air campaign, the province of Kosovo became a UN 
protectorate. Under UN mandate, NATO took the lead and together with Russia under the 
PfP agreement built a peacekeeping force, KFOR, which still operates in the area.2 In so 
                                                 
1 In the 1990’s, prior the wars, there were six republics in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: were 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Kosovo region had the 
status of the only autonomous region within the Serbia territory under direct Serbian leadership.  
Independence was declared first by Slovenia, followed by Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Macedonia. Serbia and Montenegro declared themselves the successors of Yugoslavia. In 1999, Kosovo 
began to seek its own identity, either as an independent Albanian state or as autonomous region with 
extensive privileges.  Today the international community recognizes, in accordance with international law 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia as independent states. The final arrangement 
for the status of Kosovo is not yet clear. In 2003, with the support of the European Union (EU), Serbia and 
Montenegro officially denounced the Former Yugoslavia and formed a new federal union called “the State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SUSM).” The treaty between Serbia and Montenegro establishing the 
SUSM had an initial commitment of three years. Since the late 1990’s, Montenegro never stopped trying to 
gain independence from Serbia. However, the international community was reluctant to go along, seeking 
to end trouble in the region.  On May 21, 2006, after a referendum, Montenegro became an independent 
state.         
2 Immediately after the NATO air campaign, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, 
which declared Kosovo an international protectorate and authorized NATO to assemble the peacekeeping 
military force to ensure safe and secure environment for implementation of the UN standards for Kosovo. 
For more information see the official NATO website, www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/documents/unscr1244.htm; 
accessed 21 January 2007.  
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doing, NATO became seen in Serbia as an aggressor, and the image of NATO as an 
organization was very negative, because Milosevic's propaganda focused on the air 
campaign and blamed NATO for all the catastrophic consequences of the dissolution of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
Today, six years since Milosevic was forced to step down and was transferred to 
the Hague tribunal to be tried for war crimes, former adversaries have become partners 
for the sake of security and stability in Southeastern Europe.  During this period, and 
especially between 2003 and 2006, the federal government put a lot of effort into 
achieving the ultimate goal of Serbian policy toward NATO: membership in the PfP 
program.  With the realization of Serbian president Tadic's dream, there are many 
questions about how Serbia can best take advantage of the PfP's potential.  
This thesis is explores the relationship between Serbia and NATO by focusing on 
the following questions: How can Serbia and NATO benefit from their partnership under 
the PfP program? If the PfP program is conceived as an overarching project combining 
many different state security programs, how can Serbia identify its needs for assistance as 
a consumer of security and also be an active player that contributes to security in the 
region and for NATO as well?  
Answering those questions will allow development of policy recommendations 
for cooperation and confidence building measures that can be included in Serbia's 
Individual Partnership Program. This thesis investigates the weak points of Serbian 
government policy toward security, what is missing, and how NATO can help Serbia by 
utilizing the PfP program.  
The basic purpose of the NATO PfP program is to build comprehensive, trusting 
partnerships among participating nations in regards to state security. State security policy 
is aimed at improving the security environment by reducing the influence of commonly 
accepted risks and challenging events ranging from natural disasters to war. A PfP nation 
can use the knowledge, expertise and resources of NATO or draw upon bilateral 
agreements among PfP participants. After identifying policy problems and discussing 
best practices with other countries facing similar issues, Serbia will be able to propose 
specific measures and actions to overcome its own security problems.  
3 
The thesis takes the position that Serbia has problems in three major issues related 
to the security of the state.  Serbia's main problems include: (1) weak civilian control of 
the military and intelligence services, (2) inadequate legal basis and appropriate 
legislation for effective leadership to transform the military and intelligence services, and 
(3) a deeply troubled heritage stemming from the period when Milosevic was in power. 
This heritage includes war crimes indictments against former military commanders, 
intelligence chiefs, state and political leaders, as well as the unresolved final status of the 
Kosovo province, where for the past seven years the ethnic Albanian population has 
sought political independence from Serbia.3 
Serbia's PfP membership can most directly benefit Serbian authorities now and 
for the foreseeable future by providing expert support for solving the first two problems. 
These problems can be resolved by defining a clear and transparent state security policy 
and effective mechanisms for implementing it. Serbian participation in the NATO PfP 
program has no potential to solve the third security issue, because in regards to war 
criminals and Kosovo's final status, NATO's role is to support the UN. However, PfP 
membership can provide an additional forum for governments to openly discuss, as 
equals, issues like the territorial integrity of Serbia and war crime convictions. The 
analysis of Serbian state security policy as a variable focuses on government actions and 
institutional (especially military) development and on intelligence relevant to national 
security.   
The military and intelligence services, historically important elements of the 
Serbian state security apparatus, will continue to play a vital role in national security. 
These institutions face the challenge of developing adequate capabilities in the face of 
emerging security threats like global terrorism, organized crime, and proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. Here the PfP program can help a lot.  This thesis focuses on 
the current situation in these institutions because state policy toward these institutions 
will shape the new state security environment of Serbia as a member of the PfP program.        
                                                 
3 During the wars with Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo (1992-1999), the Federal Army, 
the Serbian police forces and the state security service members committed enormous numbers of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity (more then 11,000 cases, according to the International Tribunal for 
crimes in Former Yugoslavia, the ITCY).  The international community, including the UN, NATO and the 
EU all raised the question of bringing the guilty to justice. The ICTY lists more than 92 top officials from 
the former Yugoslavia republics.  The majority of indicted persons come from Serbia.      
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B. DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
1. State Security Policy   
State security policy, the dependant variable, incorporates many different 
interrelated issues.  
Here the term state is used as a summary concept referring to bureaucratic 
institutions like the military and intelligence with legitimate authority to use violent 
means, including weapons, to exercise authority over a territory and provide security in a 
broader sense for its citizens. 4 
Security means all activities involved in protecting the country or its citizens 
against attacks or danger, no matter if the source is inside or outside the state's borders.  
Policy refers to a state action plan, aimed at achieving certain goals, based on 
agreement among the players in the political system, participants in the government 
institutions, and society.     
The analysis of state security policy focuses on Serbian government actions and 
institutional development of the military and intelligence service. State security policy is 
a combined dependent variable.  Analyzing the independent variables described below 
today provides a general description of the status of the security issues in Serbia. 
a)  Legal framework.   Every government system defines responsibilities and 
authorities of the state bodies involved in security affairs. For state security, the 
responsibilities for policymaking and policy decision-making are prioritized and 
distributed among several institutions, the most important of which are the 
President, the government (or cabinet) and the Parliament. The new challenge 
for Serbia is to develop adequate, reliable and specific laws to deal with the 
country's new status and its government institutions. The division of labor and 
procedures for decision-making and executing policy are described in the 
constitution, Law of the Army, Law of Security Service, and other specific 
laws. The names of such laws vary from country to country. Serbia in this 
regard is not exceptional. However, prior to May 2006, when Montenegro's 
independence ended the State Union, the only mechanism by which Serbia                                                  
4 The definition is inspired by Max Weber’ approach to the state as analyzed by Juan J. Linz and 
Alfred Stepan,  Problems of Democratic Transition And Consolidation:  Southern Europe, South America 
and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 17-24.      
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could deal with the military as an institution was described in federal laws. 
Under federal laws like the State Union Constitutional Charter, the Serbian 
president and some members of the federal parliament were involved in 
controlling the army. As a matter of fact, however, the Serbian parliament and 
the government had no official authority for exercising civilian control over the 
Army.  Serbia's new challenge is to develop a reliable and specific series of 
laws to deal with the new status of the country and its government institutions.     
  
b) Army reform.  The variable of army reform is the process of transforming 
the Serbian armed forces (also referred to as the military or the VS) in 
accordance with the standards of the PfP program. The discussion emphasizes 
the transformation of three elements: doctrines, tasks and organization.  
 
c) State security services reform.    The variable of state security services 
reform describes the process of transforming the military intelligence service 
and Serbian state security service (hereafter referred to as the BIA) in 
accordance with the standards of a democratic state.  Discussion focuses on the 
transformation of three elements: doctrines, tasks and organization. 
 
d) Public attitude.  The variable of public attitudes is measured by the level 
of support from society for reforms in Serbia. To achieve PfP objectives, in the 
opinion of this author, reforms are necessary at the government level, in the 
military's structures and capabilities, and inside the security services. The 
variable of state security policy and its components are analyzed descriptively, 
and the analytical scale presented in the thesis supports conclusions and policy 
recommendations for Serbia's draft of its Individual Partnership Program.     
C. ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK  
The overall analysis is based on evaluation of the single dependant variable, state 
security policy. The current status of the variable is described, based on current 
measurements of the independent variables. The current status of the variables is derived 
6 
from descriptions that identify the caps and the weak points in regard to all aspects of the 
variables. These descriptions are used as the starting point for measurement.  
Evaluation is applied to post-Milosevic Serbia, from October 5, 2000 through the 
end of 2006, which is divided into three periods. The first period is 2000 to 2003, when 
the future of the federal state Yugoslavia was unclear. The second period, between 2003 
and May 2006, is when the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was formed and 
functioning. In the third period, from May 2006 through the end of the year, Serbia 
became a single state and was accepted into the NATO PfP program.  The analysis begins 
in 2000 because Serbian aspirations for joining PfP were first publicly announced at the 
end that year. 
The variables in this thesis are described as follows.  
State security policy is characterized as progressing or worsening. Progressing  
means the institutions involved in creating state security policy have conducted certain 
actions for crafting appropriate laws, enabling adequate reforms in the military and the 
security service in accordance with internationally recognized standards like NATO PfP 
initiative, with positive support from the population. Worsening means that the 
performance of the government institutions is not leading to progress in state security 
laws, or describes a slowdown or lack of reform in the military and security service along 
with negative attitudes expressed by the Serbian people.   
The legal framework in any country, in general, can be evaluated as appropriate 
or inappropriate in regard to specified criteria. The thesis uses these concepts for the 
purpose of analysis. The legal framework of Serbia is considered appropriate insofar as 
the laws facilitate reforms in the security sector and allow official government institutions 
to exercise their authority in accordance with internationally recognized standards. The 
most critical of these standards is democratic civilian control of the military and 
intelligence services.  Government institutions mean the president, the government, and 
the parliament.    
Army reform, for the purpose of analysis, is measured as adequate or inadequate. 
Adequate army reform leads to doctrine, tasks and organization that allow the institution 
to be effective, efficient and successful in executing its mission in accordance with law 
7 
and government policy. The mission is to address new security risks and challenges and 
shape Serbia's security environment in accordance with PfP membership responsibilities.     
The state security services reform variable is treated the same as the army reform 
variable.   
Public attitudes toward reform, in general and for the purpose of this research, can 
be considered positive or negative. Positive means supportive to the governmental 
institutions' efforts. In other words, people are ready to support the reforms by paying the 
cost of the reform with a clear understanding of the purpose, duration and outcome of the 
process.  Negative means that people are not convinced that the efforts will produce the 
desired results because they are not sure of the purpose, duration and necessity of the 
reforms.  
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS  
Chapter I introduces the topic and defines the variables. Chapter II deals with the 
legal framework issues, exploring a short overview of relevant history and the current 
status of the Serbian legislature in relation to security policy.  Chapter III discusses army 
reforms, and Chapter IV deals with the issue of reforming the state security service. 
Chapter V addresses the public attitude toward reforms.  Chapter VI summarizes the 
previous chapters and, based on the findings, presents policy recommendations and draw 
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II. NATO PFP PROGRAM OBJECTIVES AND LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 
This chapter discusses the NATO PfP program objectives and their implications 
for the legal framework in Serbia.  Examining the PfP objectives and the current situation 
in Serbia allows evaluation of the variable and assessment of the weak points of the 
current legislative situation.  
A. PFP OBJECTIVES 
The core purpose of the NATO PfP program is to enhance security in Europe by 
reducing security challenges for alliance members and other countries in the region. This 
can be achieved by promoting cooperation instead of confrontation between European 
countries. In order to achieve that goal, NATO in 1994 launched the PfP initiative during 
the Brussels annual summit of the North Atlantic Council. In that meeting, the so-called 
Framework Document, containing the program objectives, was presented.  
According to the 2001 NATO Handbook, the objectives are: 
 
• to facilitate transparency in national defence planning and budgeting 
process; 
• to ensure democratic control of defence forces; 
• to maintain the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under 
the authority of the United Nations and/or the responsibility of the OSCE; 
• to develop cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of 
joint planning, training and exercises, in order to strengthen the ability of 
PfP participants to undertake missions in the field of peacekeeping, search 
and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently 
agreed; 
• to develop over long term, forces that are better able to operate with those 
of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.5  
 
This quote shows, having signed the NATO PfP program framework document, 
Serbia’s government must initiate the process of legislative adaptation in accordance with 
the country's membership status.  
 
                                                 
5 NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 68.  
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B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF SERBIA AND NATO PFP OBJECTIVES   
The year 2006 was unique Serbia's history as a state. In that year, the union with 
Montenegro came to an end, and since May, 2006 Serbia has been a single sovereign 
state, successor of all international obligations and rights of the former federal formation, 
the State Union. The Union was formed in 2003 on the basis of an agreement between the 
two countries to develop a common foreign and security policy, maintain a single 
military force for defense of the union, and share currency and economic policy.  The 
basic document for the State Union establishment was signed with the support of the 
European Union.  
During the three years of its existence, the federal legislative body (the federal 
parliament) put a lot of effort into crafting and adopting appropriate legislation to 
facilitate the common foreign policy goals of both countries, which were joining the PfP 
program and accession into the European Union. The federal Constitutional Charter was 
the first democratic law designed to establish a transparent defense planning and 
budgeting process. For the first time, principles for democratic control of the military 
were established and clearly stated in the constitutional text and the tasks and 
responsibilities of the different government institutions, structures and bodies were 
clearly described.  In addition, the law governing the state security service was adopted 
and the law for civilian control of the Army was drafted.   
Although these positive changes took place, Serbian political reality was different. 
The situation from October 2000 until 2003 was very tense. As Batic Bacevic wrote in 
2003,  
In the countries of the former Yugoslavia, which spent the last ten years 
fearing of non-controlled armed forces, it is usual to believe that civil 
control of the army, intelligence secret services and police simply cannot 
have weak points. This question is extremely important for Serbia and 
Montenegro, where military and police forces used to guard rulers more 
often than the people, but that is also the reason why these processes are to 
be approached very cautiously. This conclusion is also based on the 
experience of the post-Milošević’s Serbia in which the political elites were 
frantically fighting for the control over police or military centres of power, 
leaving an impression that only those civilians who belong to “the proper” 
parties can control the armed forces. ... [T]he late Prime Minister Zoran 
Djindjić and his allies controlled police and State Secret Service very 
11 
firmly while the parliamentary control of these services has remained a 
bad mask for conserving the situation in these sectors…6  
This was the environment of post-Milosevic Serbia until all of the Union's federal 
institutions were set up to work better. Even the president, considered the most powerful 
institution to exert any sort of control over the military, was reluctant to act to change the 
situation. No actions were taken until 2003.  
[T]he first democratic president Vojislav Kostunica was severely criticised 
for keeping Nebojša Pavković at the position of the chief of General Staff. 
Namely, Pavković did his best to present the Army as the personal guard 
of President Milošević, during the last phase of his regime. Playing the 
role of the promoter of the lowest political poltroonery, Pavković tirelessly 
defended “the supreme commander,” seeing all his political opponents as 
the NATO agents who are destabilising the country “for a few dollars 
more.” However, when Kostunica decided to dismiss Pavković, he faced 
the confrontation and protests of his main rivals in the ruling coalition, 
who suddenly made friendship with the cast out general. They even 
collected the signatures for Pavković’s presidential candidacy, as well as 
the money for his campaign.7 
 These facts show the extent to which the political elite of post-Milosevic Serbia 
was influenced by the military. They also show that the military during this time had a 
status “above the law.”  Under these conditions, how can one expect political leaders to 
be objective and take action to bring the military under civilian control?     
 Like the president, the federal parliament in this period was very passive in 
exercising its legitimate right to control the military.  
In the period from October 5 until the State Union was created, the federal 
parliamentary committee, which was to control the AY, had met only 
several times within almost 30 months. The additional obstacle to the 
parliamentary control was the fact that the president of that committee was 
the retired general Momcilo Perisic, who had been the chief of General 
Staff by the end of 1998. Until the moment Milosevic said his final 





                                                 
6 Batin Bacevic, Weak Points of Civil Control  (Belgrade: Center for Civil-Military Relations, 2003), 
1. Available from www.ccmr-bg.org/analize/rec/word24print.htm; accessed 20 November 2005.    
7 Bacevic, 1.  
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have give an account to taxpayers and he had mostly supported the Titoist 
understanding of the Army “which is guarding the state while the citizens 
are sleeping soundly.”8  
 Who controlled the military up until 2003? The answer is no one. Neither the 
president nor the parliament was in charge. The institutional confusion in Serbia went 
even deeper, since the federal government responsible for policy making and budgeting 
for defense and the military was outside the line of control.  
[T]he Army and General Staff were not subordinated to the federal 
Defence Ministry. However, until Boris Tadic became the minister, this 
Ministry had hardly been able to perform the civil control of the Army 
adequately since a great number of officers had been employed here also, 
influencing the Ministry’s policy in a great deal, while the minister 
himself had only had a formal position. Finally, the only institution which 
had fulfilled the duty of controlling the Army in the last period – Supreme 
Defence Council, reflected the depths of the crisis in the state which has 
been swaying for two years between transformation of the federal state 
into somewhat loose state or creation of two completely separated states, 
along with the possibility that the Serbian province Kosovo leaves for 
independence. Beside Kostunica, the members of the Council were 
Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic, who did not recognise the 
federal state in many ways and Serbian President Milan Milutinovic, who 
was not recognised by the state for many reasons. The whole democratic 
process, the armed forces reform included, was simply chained by totally 
undefined relations between Serbia and Montenegro, by old-fashioned  
constitutional and legal regulations which, on the other side, were kept on 
standby until the basic dilemma has been solved – if the state would 
survive at all… 9 
  While the political leadership was confused, the Army modified itself and started 
changing its organization and function.  The changes were conducted not because of 
changes in law or political guidance, but rather were driven mainly by lack of money. 
In the period from October 2000 until the new State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro was created, certain changes in the Army had occurred (the 
number of Army of Yugoslavia members had been reduced from 108,000 
to less than 80,000; military service had been reduced from 12 to nine 
months; the organisation of the AY had been changed since the armies had 
been abolished and the corps introduced; almost one half of the generals 
had been retired and the Army kept away from the daily policy) but still 
                                                 
8 Bacevic, 2. 
9 Bacevic, 2. 
13 
there remained the public impression that the real changes have not started 
yet. That impression was based on the unpleasant knowledge that the 
Army, as well as the police, still remains a kind of alienated and self-
satisfactory mini-state, still questioning if it should incorporate within the 
state which employs it and hence accept a whole set of the new rules. One 
of the basic rules is the civil control. There hardly was any of it. 10 
 These negative issues started to be addressed appropriately when the State Union 
of Serbia and Montenegro was formed in 2003.  Furthermore, the legislative and political 
process of gaining control over the military and security service was accelerated by the 
clear political will of the new ruling elite.    
When the Constitutional Charter was adopted and new government of the 
State Union was formed, after the marathon negotiation, it looked as if all 
the obstacles on the way to the complete civil control were removed. Soon 
the decision was brought that General Staff was to be subordinated to 
Defence Ministry; the opinion that we should enter Partnership for Peace 
Programme and NATO in future was more clearly formulated although the 
public opinion polls show that NATO and the Hague Tribunal are on the 
top of the most unpopular international organisations. New civil 
controllers of the Army, first of all Defence Minister Boris Tadic and the 
State Union President Svetozar Marovic, made it clear that no member of 
the Army may protect those indicted by the Hague Tribunal, implying 
certain structures, primarily in the military intelligence, had been doing 
that in the previous period. However, such statements can be interpreted as 
a part of the usual instrumentalisation of “the Hague issue” in the conflict 
between Kostunica and the part of the ruling coalition which describes 
itself as a reformational part of former winning coalition. 11 
Reforming the army chain of command continued in 2003.  After the first step to 
regain civilian control over the military mentioned by Bacevic in the above quote, the 
next step was to execute the decision to integrate the General Staff of the Serbian Army 
into the Ministry of Defense structure.12  Since then, the General Staff of VS has been a 
part of the Ministry of Defense. The exact type of subordination is shown on Figure 1.  
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12 Spiridon Spiridonov, “Serbian General Staff is integrated into the Ministry of Defense” Bulgarian 
Army, 15589, 7 May 2003. Available from http://s1.md2.dd:8080/iformer.wwv_main.bgdoc?doc=4207; 
accessed 25 August 2004.  (Available in the Bulgarian language only.) 
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The subordination of the General Staff has not changed since May 2006, when the 
Union Ministry of Defense became the Serbian Ministry of Defense.  
These steps by the political leadership of the union were possible due to the 
adaptation of the Constitutional Charter of the federal state.  This was the very first 
document in the history of the legislature of the former Yugoslavia to provide clear 
division of responsibility among the different government institutions regarding the 
control of the military and the security services.  The basic difference in comparison with 
the constitution from the post-communist and Milosevic era is that the military is subject 
to real civilian control.14   
By virtue of the Union constitution, the most important federal institutions in the 
area of security and policy were the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and the Supreme Defense Council (SDC). The main task of the Supreme Defense Council 
                                                 
13 The figure is taken from Colonel Branko Andric, Reform of the Army of Serbia and Montenegro 
(Belgrade: Center for Civil Military Relations, 2004), 4. Available from www.ccmr-
bg.org/analize/rec/word43print.pdf; accessed 20 November 2005.    
14  Prior to 1989, when the democratic changes occurred in Eastern Europe, the constitutions of former 
communist countries specified that the Communist party had a leading role in all state matters. Examples 
include the USSR, Romania and the German Democratic Republic. Bulgaria is an example of the two-party 
system of government, with the Bulgarian communist party (BCP) and Bulgarian Agrarian People Union 
(BZNS). However, Article One of the 1974 constitution stated that the leading role is assigned to the BCP. 
The BCP exercised control over the armed forces by various means and institutions. Serbia was not an 
exception; in the constitution, since 1992 the leading role was given to the league of Yugoslavian 
Communists.  
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was to provide guidelines for the armed forces, exercise control over policy 
implementation and monitor the system of promotion and retirement of flag and senior 
(colonel and above) officers. The SDC, a collective body, included the President of the 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro and the presidents of the member states. Article 56 
deals with the issue.15  The Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 
Chief of the General Staff and the Service Commanders participate in the working 
meetings without the right to vote.  
By virtue of the constitution, having as Supreme Commander a “body” of three 
persons instead of one supported civilian control over the military, and placed an obstacle 
in the way of any hoping to use the military for their own purposes and benefit, as 
happened during the Milosevic regime.    
The armed forces received their orders from the Supreme Defense Council (SDC) 
through the Ministry of Defense. The SDC decisions are collective and are approved by 
consensus; each member has veto power. In that way the top army leadership is more 
responsible and accountable in front of at least two civilian institutions, which defuses 
their influence on the political level. Encouraged by the positive provisions of the 
Constitution, experts on the federal government began to discuss the future of the 
military.   
 The first open discussions between the political ruling elite and society about the 
real role of the military in the state organization took place during this time. Beginning in 
2003, the media has been increasingly involved in political disputes about the role of all 
state institutions, including the military. As Bacevic writes,   
[The] new ruling coalition is ... determined to start profound reforms of 
military structures quickly and without hesitation, announcing the new 
steps leading to reduction of the Army. President Marović’s advisor for 
military issues Blagoje Grahovac even questioned the sense of keeping 
army at all if the country is going to lead peaceful policy and intends to 
join the Western military alliance. A little bit later, in his programmatic 
text “Defence Problems in the West Balkans” (with a poetic subtitle 
“Facing Future”), Grahovac says the Army should have up to 25,000 
members and needs no Navy. Completely different view is shared by 
                                                 
15 The Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (Belgrade, 2003), 10. 
Available from http://www.gov.yu/document/povelja.pdf ; accessed 25 January 2004.  
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Defence Minister Tadic and his advisors – he has made it clear that the 
Army should have 50,000 members, Air Force and Navy included.16 
 At the time, the Union was experiencing the same problems as all other Eastern 
European countries. The same discussion had taken place in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary (a NATO member since 1999), Bulgaria and Romania (both PfP members with 
clearly defined Membership Action Plans, MAPs, leading toward full membership in the 
Alliance).  The problems with legitimizing and justifying the reforms in the military had 
been experienced by all these countries.  
 Because of these discussions, the draft of the National Security Strategy prepared 
by the Ministry of Defense was presented in the parliament in late 2004.  Unfortunately, 
the document was not adopted by the parliament due to political reasons. Montenegro had 
restated its position and its intention to become an independent state.  
 The practice proposed by the Constitutional Charter showed some weaknesses. 
The most important was that there was no written statement about specific laws for more 
detailed regulation of the relations and procedures among institutions in regard to civilian 
control of the military. For the lawmakers, the subordination of the military to the 
Ministry of Defense was enough.      
 The federal government was very active in establishing working procedures for 
civilian control of the military in regard to PfP objectives.  In the beginning of 2005, with 
the support of United Kingdom experts, the first White Book for Defense was published. 
The book announced all principles driving the decision making process in Serbia related 
to national security and defense. The defense budget procedures were clearly articulated 
and the new defense strategy was announced.17 
 In addition to this document, in late 2005 the Federal Ministry of Defense 
proposed a draft of a law entitled “Civilian Control of the Army.” The draft was 
scheduled to be discussed and was expected to be approved by the federal parliament in 
the last half of 2006, after consultation with the Defense Reform Group inside the 
Ministry of Defense, itself newly established in February 2006. The group, under UK  
 
                                                 
16 Bacevic, 2.  
17 More detailed discussion of this document is presented in the next chapter. 
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leadership, includes experts from NATO member countries in different fields.  
Unfortunately, the process ended in May 2006, after Montenegro's declaration of 
independence.  
 In addition to federal government activities, Parliament has taken some actions. In 
the new Union Constitutional Charter, for the first time the parliament received a control 
function in regard to defense and security.  The basic role of the parliamentary oversight 
is to ensure that the military will work within the framework of the rule of law. This is 
one of the important tasks of the federal institutions in the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro. As Sasa Jankovic notes,   
The parliament is the institution, which to the largest extent ensures the 
democratic nature of the control over intelligence-security services. In 
order to be able to basically respond to the requirements of parliamentary 
control, the house must have a proper formal framework and operating 
authorities (good quality and legally based control authorities), human and 
material potential (parliamentarians versed in the theory and practice of 
parliamentary control, efficient and numerically adequate professional 
staff, an appropriate budget...), as well as political will to actually exercise 
this control (as already mentioned, parliamentary control of intelligence-
security services is simultaneously the control of the government which, 
as a rule, includes highest officials of parliamentary parties).18 
By virtue of the Constitutional Chart, the control function over federal policy 
reforming the military and security service was assigned to the parliament. The actual 
bodies which were to exercise this authority were the Committee of Defense and Security 
and the Commission for Control of the Security Services. 
It is certain that the parliamentary control of the Army will be performed 
through the Committee of Defence and Security and the Commission for 
Control the Security Services. The scope of the Committee of Defence and 
Security should include – besides analysing draft laws on defence and 
army issues and production, traffic and transport of arms – the regulated 
participation in defining the national security policy of the State Union, 
which should be adopted by the Parliament as the highest legislative body. 
The Parliament, consisting of democratically elected deputies, will express 
interests of the people in the sphere of defence and therefore it should take 
part in creating and passing into effect the most important decisions in this 
                                                 
18 Sasa Jankovic, Democratic Civil Control of Intelligence-Security Services in Serbia (Belgrade: 
Center for Civil Military Relations, 2006), 3. Available from http://www.ccmr-
bg.org/cms/view.php?id=1832; accessed 6 January 2007.  
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field, as well as in refer to reorganisation, transformation and 
modernisation of the Serbian and Montenegrin Armed Forces. 19 
 That was the intention, and indeed the committee was established. But in reality, 
none of the committee members had interest in his job because relations inside the 
parliament were unclear. Montenegro, as always during 2003-2006, was seeking any 
opportunity to distinguish itself from Serbia. The behavior of Montenegrin officials was 
driven by the fact that during the wars, the military was in the process of Serbization. On 
many different occasions the military forces were officially referred to as Serbian army 
(Vojska Srpska).   
The Parliament was less passive in regard to the control of the state security 
services. In 2004 Serbia adopted a law regulating the relations between the state security 
service and government officials. Like the Law of Army, it is designed to define the 
responsibilities, tasks and rights of the state security service.20    
The law's major stress is on control of intelligence as organization and process. 
Milos Jeftic writes,   
[Article] 5 of the Law regulates that the security services, which were 
within the SMAF General Staff, are to be transformed into the Military 
Security Service and Military Intelligence Service within the Defence 
Ministry. Therefore, the Council of Ministers are enabled to get authority 
over all security services (there are the Investigation and Documentation 
Service and Security Service within the Interior Ministry). [Article] 6 of 
the Law regulates the obligation of internal cooperation among the federal 
services, as well as the need for their cooperation with the corresponding 
services in the members of State Union, and with the security services of 
other countries. [Articles] 17-19 of the Law regulate the obligation of the 
services to submit annual reports about the activities to the Council of 
Ministers and to the Parliament and they are also obliged to submit the 
reports on certain questions and problems when demanded by the Council 
of Ministers and the Parliament. The important new regulation, introduced 
by this Law, is that the services are obliged to inform the public about 
their activities. The whole Chapter VII of the Law is on the democratic 
civil control. This part of the Law establishes a new legal institute of the 
                                                 
19 Milos Jeftic, Parlamentary Control of the Army (Belgrade: Center for Civil Military Relations, 
2003). Available from http://ccmr-bg.org/analize/rec/word18print.htm; accessed 20 November 2005.  
20  Subject to the law were the security services at the time, which included the federal military 
intelligence (VOS) and counterintelligence services (KOS), the Serbian state security service (BIA), the 
Montenegro Police Intelligence Service, and the Information and Documentation Department in Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. More detailed discussion of the security services is presented in Chapter III.    
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democratic civil control of the services, performed by the Parliament of 
SCG through the Commission for Control of Security Services. The 
General Inspector, who controls the work of the services, is also 
established by this Law and the Council of Ministers is authorised to 
appoint him.21 
All these previous best practices, initiatives and legislation have not been very 
useful since the beginning of 2006, when, approaching the end of the State Union's first 
three years, the will for independence in Montenegro increased. After May 2006, when 
Montenegro became an independent sovereign state, all federal laws became outdated.  
The legislation designed to improve the institutional relations between the federal and 
republican government bodies in order to match NATO PfP objectives, thus needed to be 
redrafted to reflect the new situation. Since the split, Serbia has been declared the 
successor of the State Union. The split itself posed a lot challenges for the political elites 
and governments of both states. The military was split into two parts; the federal Foreign 
Ministry became the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Ministry of 
Defense became the Serbian Ministry of Defense. Neither ministry changed its structure 
and organization.       
The first priority for the parliament and government was to change the 
Constitution, as all of the new institutions and procedures which never worked at the 
republic level needed to be incorporated into the government system. In practice, the 
country needed a new constitution.  For purely political reasons, the reforms were 
slowed, because in 2006 the final status of Kosovo was beginning to be discussed in the 
international arena and in Serbia itself. Kosovo's status became issue number one in the 
political life of Serbia. As the year progressed, constitutional and government reform 
were postponed. Finally, in October 2006 after the referendum, the new constitution was 
adopted.  
Like the Union constitutional charter, this constitution is the first of its kind. With 
regard to civilian control of the military, for the first time the president of Serbia is 
recognized as commander in chief. However, the exact relations between the president, 
the government and the parliament, on the one hand, and the military, on the other, must 
be specified in a separate law.      
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European democratic values are stated as a cornerstone in the new constitution 
and are used as a general standard for arranging rules and relations among Serbia's 
institutions and citizens.  But anything further from the legislative point of view is 
postponed until after the parliamentary elections of January 2007.  
Given all that has happened in the legislative sphere, in order to have laws 
compatible with or promoting institutions and procedures that meet NATO PfP 
objectives, in many respects the legal framework in Serbia at this moment is 
inappropriate. The tendency toward harmonizing legislation with PfP objectives persists, 
but the actual process of doing it and the actions taken by the authorities are far from 
perfect.  
In regard to civilian control of the military and security service, the federal 
legislature can be a big help and the legal framework is appropriate. However, the 
strengthening of the parliament's role as an oversight body needs a lot of improvement 
and work.  As Bacevic writes,    
In their history, Serbia and Montenegro experienced the whole range of 
authoritarian orders but managed only in very short intervals to feel the 
benefits of democratic society. Therefore, political elites – but the citizens 
as well – still favour “strong hand” policy, neglecting fundamental rules of 
democratic society, feeling contempt for parliamentarianism and lawful 
authority of the state which “only makes obstacles or delays rapid 
development of the country.” Experience teaches us that the security 
forces “of all types” can certainly be misused against not only 
neighbouring nations but also against the citizens who are financing these 
forces. Therefore, all weak points of the civil control of the army should 
be considered, since they are almost inevitable in the society still being 
formed but also stays chained by certain parts of Milošević’s political 
testament. In Turkey, one of the countries willing to join EU, the army 
repeatedly saved secular democratic order, endangered by the parties 
which had previously won democratic elections. This unhappy example is 
mentioned here only because we have been influenced by Osmanli policy. 
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Serbia probably needed these six years to learn its lessons, but as long as the 
society supports politicians' efforts and has the will to integrate the country into the PfP 
program to the maximum extent possible, the process will continue and NATO will help 
a lot.   A similar opinion is expressed by Jeftic:   
Democratic changes in our country open, undoubtedly, many questions 
about work and efficiency of the state organs. The role of the public and 
control of activities in all fields of the society are the necessary 
prerequisites for joining European integration, and also Partnership for  
Peace and NATO. Further development of democracy in Serbia and 
Montenegro will not be possible without an organized, constant and 
efficient control. 23 
Whatever action is to be taken by the Serbian government with the support of 
NATO in meeting PfP objectives, doubtless there is a need for a solid legal framework. 
This should join the other major priorities of the new ruling political elite after the 




                                                 

















III. NATO PFP PROGRAM AND ARMY REFORM 
Throughout their history, the Serbian military forces, like armed forces elsewhere, 
have been seen as the major guardians of the state. The military, with its natural task of 
protecting the state, has always been in the process of reforming its own organization and 
transforming its capabilities in order to address security risks and challenges—those 
already known, and those that may be forthcoming.  
Like the state of Serbia, the military faced a long road from its highly politicized 
position at the start of reforms in 2000 to the status of trusted partner providing state 
security in cooperation with NATO, its former adversary. In this regard, for the past six 
years, reforms in the Serbian military have followed the political and legislative changes 
in Serbia.  
Though the military was seen as Milosevic’s “Praetorian Guard,” it suffered a lot 
during his regime. It is worth mentioning that the military played a major role in 
supporting the opposition coalition in the October 2000 federal presidential elections. On  
October 5, 2000, after Milosevic refused to recognize the victory of the opposition 
candidate Vojislav Kostunica, Serbia was on the verge of civil war. Due to military 
involvement, Milosevic was forced to step down.24 With this action General Pavcovic, 
who was the Chief of the General Staff of the Army had set a condition for keeping the 
political role of the Military as it was in the previous times, but the times had changed.25     
 From 2000 to 2003, the military was still playing a big role in political life of 
Serbia and Montenegro. But when federal President Kostunica sacked the powerful 
General Pavcovic from his job as Chief of the General Staff in 2002, it was clear that 
under the new leadership, the military would have a different role, and not a political one.  
On 24th June 2002, at a meeting of the Supreme Defence Council (SDC) 
of Yugoslavia – a body composed of the presidents of Serbia (Milan 
Milutinovic), Montenegro (Milo Djukanovic) and FRY (Vojislav 
Kostunica) that in theory exercises control of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) – 
                                                 
24 James Gow described this moment very well in “Milosevic's Downfall and the Military," the last 
part of his study, “Serbia and the Politics of the Yugoslav Armies: Communism, Federalism and 
Democracy” in Kees Kooning and Dirk Kruijt, eds., Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in 
the Age of Democracy (London: Zed Books, 2002), 310.   
25 Gow, 310.  
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Kostunica initiated a move to remove Pavcovic. He was initially thwarted 
in this attempt when Milutinovic and Djukanovic refused to support him 
unless he also removed other key personnel from the Army top brass 
including chief of the military security service (KOS) and close ally of 
Kostunica, General Aco Tomic. Kostunica rejected this and then bypassed 
the SDC, using a presidential decree to relieve Pavcovic of his duties and 
replace him with General Branko Krga. In response, Pavcovic declared the 
decision illegal and refused to go. After talks with key generals – and 
public expressions of support from both the EU and NATO – Kostunica 
appears to secured the support of the VJ for his move, and left Pavcovic 
isolated and in limbo. 26 
 Of course, in light of the country's new orientation toward democracy and the 
political will expressed by the federal government to join the PfP program and pursue 
closer relations with Euro-Atlantic states, Pavcovic had to be removed from his post, and 
it was urgent that the army reform process begin.  
NATO countries have made it clear that they will not do business with 
Pavcovic, a stance which has direct ramifications for FRY’s future civil-
military reforms, and its prospects of joining NATO’s Partnership for 
Peace (PfP). This position is the result of two factors. First, because of 
Pavkovic’s close association with the former regime. Pavkovic was a 
Milosevic appointee, and a Milosevic loyalist. Given this background, and 
the widely held belief that he has benefited personally and financially 
from his position and connections to Milosevic circles, he is viewed by 
many as both an impediment to a reform and a continuing representation 
of a politicised ‘old guard.’ Second, Pavkovic’s background as the 
commander of the VJ’s Third Army – which was responsible for the 
actions of the Yugoslav Military in Kosovo in 1999 – associates him with 
ethnic cleansing and war crimes, and fatally compromises him in the eyes 
of the West.27 
This conflict shows the need for changes in the Serbian military's ideology, doctrines and 
role in society.  
 Later, when the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was formed and the 
Constitutional Charter was adopted, the legal foundation for army reform was 
established. 
                                                 
26 Tim Edmunds, Crisis or Turning Point? Kostunica, Pavcovic, and Civil-Military Relations in FRY 
(Belgrade: Center for Civil-Military Relations, 2002), 1.  Available from http://www.ccmr-
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 Not until late 2003 did the military take steps to align itself with the government's 
political goal of joining the NATO PfP program.  The following year is significant in the 
history of Serbia's military reform process. In 2004, the major plan for reform of the army 
was approved and under the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the military started to 
design a new national defense strategy. General Krga, former Chief of General staff, 
writes that 
Completion of the planned activities in the field of reforms was in the 
centre of our activities. 
After the commands of the armies, Air Forces and Air Defence, Navy, 
commands of divisions, fleet and certain units on the tactic level were 
decomposed last year, the Army made important reform steps: 
- According to the decision of the Supreme Defence Council (VSO), the 
SMAF General Staff is subordinated to the Defence Ministry, 
- Intelligence and Security Sector were reformed into the Military 
Intelligence Agency and Military Security Agency, subordinated to the 
Defence Ministry; 
- School centers and border units in the territory of the Republic of 
Montenegro were disbanded; 
- The draft document "Defence Strategy of the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro," was created and will be delivered to the Assembly of Serbia 
and Montenegro for adoption28 
 
The quote demonstrates that the Serbian military was focusing more on 
organizational changes and strengthening their line of subordination.  In the new Defense 
Strategy (2004) and later in the White Book on Defense (2005) the Serbian military 
leadership officially recognized the following principles for building the country's new 
defense capabilities.  Serbia, they say, 
– does not consider any state an enemy; 
– shares the belief of other countries that the stability and security of the 
Euro-Atlantic region can be realized only through cooperation and joint action; 
– is resolved to strengthen internal stability and to actively contribute to 
the security and stability of the region of South-Eastern Europe; 
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Military Relations, 2004).  Available from http://www.ccmr-bg.org/cms/view.php?id=1867; accessed 25 
October 2005. 
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– is resolved to observe and fulfill the obligations arising from the 
Dayton Peace Treaty; 
– is resolved to consistently observe UN Security Council Resolution 
1244; 
– allows temporary deployment of foreign armed forces on its territory 
only within the framework of peacekeeping missions, on the basis of UN 
decisions and agreements concluded; 
– has opted to deploy units of the Army of Serbia and Montenegro on 
foreign territories only within the framework of peacekeeping missions, on the 
basis of UN decisions and agreements concluded; 
– is resolved not to possess and not to develop weapons for mass 
destruction and to actively participate in the prevention of their proliferation.29 
 
The military's new vision of the security environment and its perception of 
security risks and challenges are no different than the views any other country in the 
region. This was a major improvement at the doctrinal level and shows that the new 
military was ready to forget the war as the only option for dealing with the former 
“enemy” states from the former Yugoslavia. The new approach is cooperation instead of 
confrontation. This new approach is articulated in the following text from a recent 
defense strategy document.   
Depending on the nature and intensity of challenges, risks and threats to 
security, the response will be: in war—by a decisive defence of the 
member states and of Serbia and Montenegro with their own forces, with 
the assistance of partners, allies and friendly states; in peace–by the 
creation of reliable partnerships and co-operation in forming a favorable 
security environment and deterrence by an integrated and efficient defence 
system. 30 
The two program documents were developed with support from the UK and the 
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2005), 12. Available from  www.mod.gov.yu; accessed 24 August, 2005. 
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is formally devoted to reorganization of its tasks and structure in accordance with NATO 
PfP objectives and areas of cooperation. This is also stated in the White Paper on 
Defense.  
It is expected that the active participation of Serbia and Montenegro in the 
“Partnership for Peace” programme will reduce the danger of external 
security threats, develop the ability to respond efficiently to contemporary 
security challenges, risks and threats, speed up the already initiated 
process of integration in Euro-Atlantic structures, increase transparency in 
defence planning, achieve a democratic and civil control of the Army and 
develop the capacity for joint action in the collective security system. 
Joining this programme would make possible a parallel development of 
interoperability and the implementation of NATO standards as an integral 
part of the reform of the defence system.31 
Following political guidance and deriving its legitimacy from the new defense 
strategy, the military lists its missions: 
 
- Deterring from armed threats and other military challenges, risks, and 
threats; 
- Defending the territory, airspace and territorial waters; 
- Participation in international military cooperation and peacekeeping 
operations under the auspices of the OUN and system of collective security, 
- Assisting civil authorities and population in situations where human 
life, the environment, and material welfare are threatened.32 
 
It is evident that these new missions are in fully consistent with NATO PfP 
objectives. They are similar to the missions for the militaries in Bulgaria and Romania, 
and they are not much different from any other military missions in the post-Cold War 
post-modern era.  
These new missions require appropriate actions to adjust military organizations 
and capabilities to the new requirements.  
- organize and prepare part of the professional peacekeeping troops to a 
high degree of combat readiness; 
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- organize enough forces for deterrence and defence of the State Union 
which will be mobile and capable of engaging in combat action under all 
conditions; 
- prepare a number of the units for participating in peacekeeping 
missions and operations in accord with the UN Charter; 
- train forces to participate in rescuing the civil population.33 
 
To fulfill those tasks, the military had to come up with a plan in which reform of 
the military structure would to bring it closer to NATO PfP standards.   The reform in the 
army was designed to follow the changes in the State Union. The intent was to conduct 
the reform in three phases between 2003 and 2010, in three periods: 2003 to 2004, 2004 
to 2006, and 2007 to 2010.   
What was actually planned and what was executed during the phases: 
The first phase (2003 to 2004) includes: adopting normative documents, 
reorganizing the General Staff and more efficient organizing the Army at 
the operative and tactic level. Within the framework of these changes, 
units will be disbanded and institutions that don’t have an adequate 
purpose and equipment, and reforming and dislocation will improve and 
increase combat readiness of the Army. Also, in the first phase we planned 
more intense participation in international peacekeeping missions and joint 
exercises with the countries in the region.34  
As discussed above, most of the tasks to institutionalize and legitimate military 
reform were done. The federal government and the parliament adopted the basic 
documents necessary for starting the reforms. 
During the same period, according to the Serbian General Staff, the structure of 
the old mass army was disbanded and a new corps level was introduced. Significant 
amounts of military equipment were withdrawn from operational units. Withdrawn 
equipment included 210 T-55 tanks, 72 OTM-60 armored transport vehicles, 98 
howitzers of 105 mm caliber, 54 M1 howitzers of 155 mm caliber, 126 T-12 anti-armored 
guns, 867 self-propelled vehicles of 90 mm, 36 guns of 130 mm, 1014 antiaircraft guns of 
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20/3 mm, 80,000 infantry weapons, and a large number of motor vehicles, 
communication devices and other equipment.35 
During this period, relationships with the militaries of other countries intensified.  
Various activities were executed inside and outside the country; NATO was a partner in 
some of them. In that regard, General Krga writes, 
Inter-army cooperation stayed in the centre of attention of the SMAF in 
the last year, which resulted by numerous visits in the country and abroad: 
27 visits of the Defence Ministry and the chief of General Staff; 106 visits 
of working groups; education and training were secured for 298 members 
of the SMAF and the Defence Ministry through 141 activities; English 
language course in Great Britain was attended by 78 candidates; four 
seminars were organized in cooperation with NATO, etc. Plans for 
military cooperation with numerous countries have been agreed on or 
signed, with our sincere wish to improve the trend we started.36 
For example, in 2003 Serbian officials made contact with Bulgaria, which had 
gone through the same process in its early years as a democracy.  In early meetings with 
the Serbian military, Bulgaria clearly stated its support for Serbian participation in the 
PfP program. Bulgaria was asked to provide military advice and expertise in regard to 
execution of reforms and pre-deployment training of military contingents participating in 
peace support operations under the auspices of the NATO agreement and UN mandates.37 
Later, in 2004, the military contacts between the Serbian and Montenegrin armies 
continued at lower working level. In March 2004, the Commander of the Nis Corp 
(formerly the Third Army) was in Sofia to conduct talks with his Bulgarian counterpart,  
the Commander of the Command West. During these talks, the Serbian side expressed 
interest in organizing and training by the Bulgarian units for participation in 
peacekeeping missions, language training, training standards, and the like. In an 
interview with the Bulgarian army newspaper, Major General Stojanovic shared that the 
purpose of the Sofia visit was to arrange pre-exercise training for the Serbian military, 
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because in May 2004 a Serbian unit was invited to participate in a joint Serbian-
Romanian exercise on peacekeeping in Romania.38  
Almost everything planned for the first phase of the reform was achieved.  
According to Andric’s research, the following activities were planned for the 
second phase:          
The second phase (2005 to 2006) includes further organizational changes on the 
operative and tactic level. The accent is on creating contours of the module 
principle of organization with battalion-division-squadron as the basis for 
organizing the Army. The characteristics of this phase is the final transfer of 
authority of guarding the state borders, forming and equipping units for 
participation in peacekeeping missions, continuation of the organization of joint 
exercises with foreign armed forces, continuing the participation in peacekeeping 
missions, continuation of schooling and training cadres abroad, carrying out the 
social program, realizing decisions on transforming military profitable 
institutions, defining the development program and equipping with modern arms 
and military equipment (from our own production and cooperation with foreign 
countries).39 
The second phase was crafted to deepen the reforms by carrying out the future 
organizational restructuring of the combat units on operational and tactical level. This 
process was very carefully prepared in 2005 and executed in 2006.  The aim was to have 
more lighter and mobile units capable of executing different missions and tasks.   
The process of preparing the peacekeeping force continued in the newly 
established Peacekeeping Training Center, with the program designed by UN selected as 
the training program.   
At the moment, members of the SMAF participate in peace and 
humanitarian missions in East Timor (two officers), Liberia (two officers) 
and DR Congo (six medics). "The National Centre for Peace Missions" 
which has been formed has the same function and is to prepare and 
coordinate all activities in connection with participation of our forces in 
peace missions.40 
Serbia was not part of NATO PfP program during the period of the training, so 
the Serbian military participated in missions under the UN flag only.                                                    
38 Colonel Cenko Velev, “We Are Interested in Your Experiences as PfP Active Participants,” 
Bulgarian Army, 15808, 10 March 2004.  Available from 
http://s1.md2.dd:8080/iformer.wwv_main.bgdoc?doc=9743; accessed 25 August 2004.  This interview with 
the Nis Corp Commander is available in the Bulgarian language only. 
39 Andric, 3. 
40 Krga, 2. 
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As far as it concerns the participation in the exercise with foreign military, 
the relations with KFOR in Southern Serbia, Kosovo I Metohia were 
improved. There were numerous activities taking place on both sides of 
the administrative border line of Kosovo where Serbian Military 
participated together with NATO member countries, like the Czech 
Republic, France, Italy and Germany. On a regular basis the KFOR 
Commander has a meeting with the Chief of the General Staff of the 
Serbian army and the Military commanders from the Nis garrison. The 
Serbian Military and KFOR soldiers have conducted joint patrols in the 
area on several occasions. 41  
Because modernizing an army requires a lot of financial resources, the Ministry of 
Defense established a Defense Reform Fund. The money was supposed to come from the 
profits earned by selling military facilities and buildings for commercial purposes or 
social activities.  Deputy Minister of Defense Maras said in 2005, 
Serbia and Montenegro is oriented towards four main components of its 
defence conversion: addressing the issue of the redundant military 
personnel; conversion of military bases and facilities; surplus military 
stockpiles, program and personnel restructuring and downsizing the 
military industries and converting the development and research in the 
military for civilian use.42    
According to Maras, NATO also helped by supporting project PRIZMA, intended 
to ease the social incorporation of retired military personnel into civilian life. The project 
was evaluated as high quality and was financially supported by the UK and the 
Netherlands' defense ministries. This project incorporates 11 programs. 43     
In February 2006, NATO Defense Reform Advisory Group was established to 
deepen the ties between the Federal Ministry of Defense and western countries in NATO 
and the EU. 44  
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All this occurred when the Union still existed.  However, even after the split 
between the two countries, the new Serbian military announced that they would continue 
with reform despite the limited resources. With this action, the Serbian military proved 
that it had no alternative other than reform. The military went beyond the initial planning, 
forming the first two fully professional brigades in September and October 2006.  
Shortly after the official announcement of Serbia's invitation to join the PfP 
program, the Military Liaison Office was established to, in NATO's words, “facilitate 
Serbian cooperation with NATO under Partnership for Peace programme.”45       
The third phase of the initial plan, from 2007 to 2010, will be conducted with the 
full support of NATO in areas already determined by the Serbian authorities. According 
to Colonel Andric the reforms during that period will involve  
completely coordinating organizations with adopted standards. In this 
phase the status of the State Union will finally be resolved and conditions 
will be set for completion of the first cycle of organizational changes and 
realization of the project of professionalization and technical 
modernization of the Army. 46 
NATO has helped Serbia in a variety of areas, including those noted by NATO 
Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Minuto-Rizzo:  
Defence reform; defence planning, budgeting and resource management; 
conceptual, planning and operational aspects of peacekeeping; the fight 
against terrorism and illegal trafficking; logistics; and language training.47   
These are exactly the areas of cooperation proposed in PfP program documents.  
To summarize this chapter, the trends in army reform can be evaluated as 
appropriate for integration of the country into the PfP program. Of course, a lot remains 
to be done to ensure the military is capable of participating in real NATO operations. The 
doctrinal document must be developed or updated, tasks need to be more clearly defined, 
and, of course, all military personnel from top to bottom need new training to be  
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compatible with NATO standards and consistent with PfP countries. Some day, 
somewhere in the world, it will be no surprise to see a Serbian military contingent 
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IV. STATE SECURITY SERVICES REFORM  
This chapter examines the reform of the Serbian state security services. These 
agencies have been seen as a “mini-state inside the state.” 48  They are still so powerful 
that they can exert enormous influence on huge range of political and social issues in 
Serbia. The new Serbian government cannot make appropriate decisions on state security 
and craft a new policy without updated and accurate information gathered by the 
intelligence services. The information must processed and distributed among the 
government institutions according to a very strict rule for preserving secrecy. At the same 
time, the process needs to be transparent in the sense that the government institutions 
need a control mechanism to insure that the information will not be used for illegal 
purposes and it is gathered in accordance with the rule of law.   
From an organizational point of view, the security services in Serbia—Military 
Intelligence (MI), including Military Counterintelligence (KOS) and the Serbian State 
Security Service (BIA)—are typical services, much like the U.S. Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA) or Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), for example. They are designed as 
full source agencies, able to gather information by utilizing different means for collecting 
and processing the information.49 A "full source agency" means that the organization has 
resources for human intelligence, signal or high-tech intelligence, imagery processing 
capabilities, and well-developed analysis capabilities.     
However, the main difference between KOS and BIA, on the one hand, and DIA 
and  CIA, on the other, is the control exercised over the U.S. intelligence community. To 
clarify, during the Milosevic era, the KOS and BIA penetrated throughout the society. At 
some point, these agencies were seen as competitors inside the regime. The KOS was 
focused on counterintelligence inside the army, while the BIA (at the time referred to as 
the SDB), tried to control everything in society, including other security agencies like the 
police and military. The SDB collected data for top military commanders which could be 
used by Milosevic or by the service at a later date. 
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There are a number of alternate centers of power inside Serbia that are at 
least as powerful as the legitimate institutions of government. After 
maintaining a low profile in the first two years since Milosevic’s fall, they 
have begun to play an increasingly visible role in politics and society. 
They are largely focused around the State Security (DB) structures 
Milosevic created to help wage his wars and keep domestic order, as well 
as around counterparts associated with the Yugoslav Army (VJ) 
Counterintelligence Service (KOS). They include illegal financing 
mechanisms and parallel military formations under the command of the 
police and DB, as well as military, domestic and foreign intelligence 
networks. Djindjic's assassins almost certainly came from and were 
supported by some part of these alternate centers of power.50 
The SDB in particular had full autonomy from the government. It penetrated 
society from bottom to top, spying on ordinary people and those at the highest level and  
wiretapping political leaders, including Milosevic family. This was the organization 
which sponsored the Milosevic regime and his private “paramilitary” security forces 
which conducted the dirtiest operations during the war, especially in Bosnia and 
Herzegovenia and Kosovo. 
In order to finance his wars and to create the security structures necessary 
to carry out the more distasteful tasks of ethnic cleansing and murder, 
Milosevic developed mechanisms to divert revenues from the state and 
from the state-controlled export and import sector. The DB plundered the 
assets of a number of former Yugoslav firms. For example nearly U.S. $30 
million from the state-owned trading company GENEX, and set up 
seemingly privately-owned front companies.51 
With support from SDB, organized crime clans established smuggling routes in 
the Balkans to import goods, petrol and money for weapons and ammunition during the 
embargo operations against Serbia between 1996 and 2000.  In fact, many active officers 
from SDB were actually in charge of the organized crime and smuggling activities during 
the embargo period. As a cover they were officially registered as owners of private 
companies.         
These, and individuals listed as their owners, enjoyed special monopoly 
privileges over exports of raw materials such as wheat and iron ore and 
weapons, as well as special import privileges. Some had the right to 
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smuggle high-tariff items, such as alcohol, tobacco, petroleum products, 
and coffee. Trafficking to and manufacture of drugs for Western Europe 
and other Balkan countries, auto theft, trafficking in women and illegal 
immigrants, and illegal export of weapons were other revenue sources.52 
As this makes clear, by the end of Milosevic regime and for at least two years 
afterwards, the SDB and the Military Intelligence Service were de facto in full control of 
the state and the political elite.  
An indicator of these agencies' power is the issue of cooperation with the Hague 
tribunal. More than ten years after the war, Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and 
his “notorious” general Ratko Mladic are still at large. The failure to arrest Mladic caused 
a break in the Stabilization and Association agreement between the European Union and 
Serbia. These two men are still in hiding, with support from nationalist elements—many  
of whom are former or active members of the BIA and KOS. 
However, the Zemun Clan, which is accused of organizing the deed, is 
believed to have received support and information and otherwise 
cooperated with individuals within the police, government and army, as 
well as several key politicians, both during Milosevic’s regime and after, 
and to be providing bodyguards at present for Ratko Mladic, one of the 
most notorious Hague indictees still at large. As an arm of Milosevic’s 
parastatal structures, carrying out numerous deniable actions against 
political enemies, it is said to have been deeply entrenched within the 
State Security (former DB, now BIA). This suspicion was given apparent 
confirmation when acting Premier Nebojsa Covic stated shortly after 
Djindjic was killed, that the police had raided the State Security offices as 
part of their investigations, and that the Zemun Clan had assisted the state 
in counter-insurgency efforts in southern Serbia. Simatovic’s Red Berets 
are notorious for their brutality during the wars of the 1990s in Croatia, 
Bosnia and Kosovo, and are widely believed to be enmeshed. The nexus 
of nationalist elements in Serbia’s police, army, political elite, state 
security and organized criminal gangs is the single greatest threat to 
regional Balkan security. So long as it remains an important factor in 
Serbian politics, the international community’s approach to the entire 
region will have to prioritize containment of these nationalist forces above 
the promise of European integration. To understand why Djindjic was 
killed, it is necessary to understand the illegal parallel state Milosevic 
created that often exercised more power than the legitimately elected 
authorities and that DOS has not dismantled.53 
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Peter Gill describes the conditions faced by the new democratic government, 
including the Milosevic-era state security service heritage, as an “independent security 
state.”54  
Here the security intelligence agency is formally embedded within the 
state yet is actually autonomous of the government and the rest of the state 
machine while penetrating deeply in the social life in its search for 
information and, probably its countering activities.55         
The concept of an “independent security state” in Serbia is illustrated in Figure 2. 
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This figure shows exactly the status of the Serbian Security Services during the 
Milosevic era. Society was penetrated by the SDB, KOS and other agencies that  become 
linked the political regime and organized crime clans to profit from illegal activities. The 
economic power of the SDB was strengthened by the fact that some of the former state 
companies now belonged to the service. After Djindjic's assassination, the politicians 
were shocked and very passive about making reforms in the sector. War criminals like 
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Mladic, thanks to the support of the SDB and the military, are still at large.57 Secrecy, as 
in 2000, still plays big role in Serbian political life today.  Even today, the politicians are 
afraid of the shadow of the security agencies' past power. However, as time passes, and 
with the change to a democratic state open to Euro-Atlantic security structures and the 
EU, the security services of Serbia must be reformed in accordance with the standards of 
NATO PfP program objectives and the new Serbian government.  
What did the Serbian government do to regain control over the security agencies 
and to reshape them in light of the new security environment of the country?      
The first step was to pass a law that clearly defines the missions, tasks and 
organizations of the security agencies in the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The law 
also specifies the relationship among the traditional branches of government (legislative, 
judicial and executive) in regard to management and control of the secret services. The 
adopted by the federal parliament in 2002, also gives mechanisms for internal and 
external control, as well as evaluation of the work of the secret services. In 2003, after the 
Union was established, the federal parliament updated the existing law to make it 
consistent with the points mentioned above.    
The next step was to implement all requirements prescribed in the Law for 
Security Services of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  
At this point, we should address the frequent view that security services 
are in practice impossible to control, since the legitimate secrecy of their 
operations and their use of special devices and techniques enable them to 
"play with" those intent to learn their secrets. Consistently advocated this 
view necessarily leads to one of the two possible conclusions: either (one) 
the intelligence-security services should be abolished in order to protect 
democracy or (two) the society consciously agrees to a state of concealed 
dictatorship of its own "guards"! Modern security environments and the 
reality of international relations give scant weight to the idea of abolishing  
 
                                                 
57 During the war in Bosnia, under Mladic's leadership in Srebrenica, more than 2,500 Bosnian 
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the services (the trend is in fact reversed). On the other hand, man 
naturally aspires towards freedom, which dispenses with the second 
option.58 
In Serbia and Montenegro the secret services were not disbanded, but rather 
reorganized. In 2003, the federal government decided to split the military intelligence 
service into two parts, thus separating the intelligence and counterintelligence functions. 
Both new services were directly subordinate to the Minister of Defense, not to the 
General Staff. Today, after the split of the State Union, the Military Security Services are 
under the direct supervision of the Minister of Defense. The Military Intelligence 
directorate was formed under the supervision of one of the deputies of the Minister of 
Defense.  Many officers who served under Milosevic regime were retired or dismissed. 
This process continued until 2006, when the last military intelligence general from 
Milosevic era was dismissed from his position as Chief of Military Intelligence of 
Ministry of Defense Directorate. As Simon Araloff from the European section of 
Association of Intelligence Analysts (AIA) notes, 
Current “cleansing” in the Ministry of Defence and in particular in 
Military Intelligence Department of Serbia and Montenegro, is aimed at 
replacing the officials, who have been working here since Slobodan 
Milosevic’s rule, by the adherents of integration in NATO and EU. 59       
From 2003 until 2006, the Military Intelligence Service has gone through severe 
organizational changes. The reorganization of the service was driven by the new law, 
national defense strategy, and the available resources. New set of tasks were put in place 
and new control mechanisms were introduced. Thanks to the current president of Serbia, 
Boris Tadic, the reform of the military intelligence service is deemed successful, because 
he managed to overcome the negative heritage and internal attitudes toward this isolated 
institution. Today all military intelligence work is controlled by the Defense Minister and 
internal inspectorate. As Ljubodrag Stojadinovic wrote in 2003, 
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The new Defence Minister Boris Tadić has announced the reform of the 
Service. Although the announcements often do not have a great 
importance, this one is a good sign and we can believe that the Minister 
really meant it since these conditions cannot be maintained. The Service is 
announced to be "excluded" from the General Staff and transferred to the 
federal Defence Ministry. Correctly, we could not even speak about the 
reform of the army if the Service were not reformed. We believe it is more 
convenient to use the word "dismantling" of the military Security Service, 
for the simple reason: the existing service cannot be used for making a 
new one. For the time being, it would be better to have no security service 
at all than to have the one like this. A new military security service, 
whatever name it formally gets, must be controlled from the very 
beginning. Its characteristic is not to be controlled but to control. 
Therefore, it is necessary to make the service’s operations legally 
regulated, for there has been no law up to now. The Service used to work 
according to the instructions it proscribed itself.60 
With new tasks and organization, the Military Intelligence Service has the 
potential to serve its true purposes.  
As far as the reform process is concerned, in counterintelligence things were not 
so smooth for the KOS as a security service inside the military and military intelligence.  
The reform process for counterintelligence took longer than reorganizing military 
intelligence. The KOS had a very negative image inside Serbia because it had organized 
“complicated networks of intelligence officers and liquidators, whose assignment was to 
uncover and eliminate prominent members of émigré groups and organizations.”61 The 
first political goal of the newly elected government after October 5, 2000 was to avoid a 
struggle with this security service. The reason for that decision is explained by 
Stojadinovic.   
The Service was the framework of the most extreme part of "the Anti-
Hague lobby". This is where the connection between the conservative part 
of then Yugoslav President’s surrounding and quasi-patriotic forces 
became logical. In fact, it was an attempt to defend the war crime or any 
other crime by the identification between patriotism and robbery and mass 
murder, during the war and after it. It was not possible to avoid the 
participation of the Service in the attempted revolution and restoration. It 
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is interesting that its documents, even the headquarter operative acts and 
the suppositions for the exercises, show a strong inertia from Milošević’s 
time – referring to the values and conception. The enemies have remained 
the same so the General Staff, in its experiments, still "expects" NATO to 
attack Serbia and Montenegro. The Service has strongly supported the past 
because its most influential members felt that their power gets 
proportionally weaker as the society becomes more democratic. Therefore 
they certainly wanted the return of isolation, fear, informing, controlling 
people and their destinies. Hence, this would be the ambiance where the 
Service would be again in the centre of all occurrences and, above all, it 
would be able to produce the worst of the occurrences.62 
The ultimate goal of the new federal government was to stay in power as long as 
possible in order to break the international isolation of the country by diminishing all 
negative consequences from Milosevic's heritage and initiating the democratization of the 
country. Moreover, having in mind that the most dangerous and influential state 
institution was the civilian State Security Service (SDB), the new federal government 
made a wise choice to have KOS on their side to counterbalance SDB power. 
Milosevic's decision to relay on police, not army, was based on the 
hesitation of considerable number of officers in face of “Serbization” of 
the People Yugoslav Army [NA] which was to turned into an instrument 
of Greater Serbian policy. Milosevic decided that it was necessary to clean 
up the KOS and the Army of Yugoslavia Intelligence service, which 
would become the brain of an officers’ plot. The decision was taken to 
remove the key cadre and to relay primarily on the police and SDB of 
Serbia, even for purely military issues. Thus the key actions in Bosnia 
were not performed by regular army but by paramilitary units fielded by 
Internal Affairs Ministry. At the same time that campaign against army 
security bodies was taking place, KOS used foreign agencies and internet 
to make counterattacks. Discoveries were made which connected the SDB 
of Serbia to wiretapping of talks between Milosevic and Karadzic. 63        
The successor of KOS is a newly designed service with new tasks and 
organization.  What has happened to SDB? As Jankovic points out,   
The Security Information Agency of Serbia (BIA) is undergoing a more 
"silent" reform than most other institutions. Except for statements that the 
Agency has in recent years experienced its largest personnel renewal ever, 
announcements of the impending adoption of the law governing the 
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opening of secret files and a number of fortuitous details one could pick 
up at receptions arranged for the press and representatives of the domestic 
and foreign security sector institutions, the public does not exactly know 
very much of what transpires in the Serbian secret service. The Agency is 
no doubt torn between a difficult political legacy inherited from its 
predecessor (State Security Department of the Interior Ministry of Serbia) 
and major requirements of the present day which combine the general 
transition difficulties with the Serbian security specifics, i.e. the 
imperative of the "full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal" (read: 
apprehension of the Hague indictees Karadzic and Mladic) and the 
problem of Kosovo. The Agency leadership is, apparently, aware of the 
fact that the democratic civil control is a principle which must not be 
questioned. However, it is less certain to what extent the Agency's 
members are aware of what the democratic civil control of intelligence 
security services actually means in practice, or of its values and possible 
benefits. In a situation where the Agency does not get a clear signal about 
that from its "controllers", it is difficult to expect that its own ranks may 
come up with the proper solution in drawing the line that separates the 
state and party politics, national and state security, efficiency and abuse of 
authority, obedience to orders and respect of law. It is even unlikely to 
expect that they will try to find it at all, engrossed as they are in the 
multitude of other issues. Furthermore, it is very uncertain whether the 
Agency staff, if they tried to counter a possible abuse of authority, would 
find reliance in democratic controlling institutions. Still, we have to note 
that the Agency is showing a correct attitude towards the (modest) 
requirements made on it by the parliamentary control. In addition, while 
the executive authority still looks for the best coordination mechanism for 
security intelligence activities as well as mechanisms to establish priorities 
and operating guidelines (recent establishment of the National Security 
Council will be remembered by the accompanying political-party 
bickering), the Agency remains out of this turmoil, leaving the impression 
and hope that it is not an active participant of political processes.64 
Both the facts and the general perception of the reforms are captured in Jankovic's 
quote.  Of course, considering the living conditions under Milosevic, it is understandable 
why in 2002 one of the first acts of Djindjic's government was to adopt a specialized law 
dealing with the tasks, organization and control of the BIA. Once a relatively modern law 
was in place, it was obvious that continued reform was just a matter of time. In practice, 
during the reform process, the agency has suffered from two major problems: decreasing 
social trust and support, and difficulties recruiting enough educated and capable BIA 
employees for comprehensive reforms.     
                                                 
64 Jankovic, 4.  
44 
Even today the agency's image is overshadowed by the negative institutional 
heritage, such as protection of war criminals, involvement by former officers in organized 
crime, illegal acts against the political elite and citizens, etc.  In the transitional period to 
democracy, the Agency began to play a significant role in gathering information against 
organized crime and international terrorism. The improved relations with other state 
institutions were noticeable and aimed at bettering the agency's image. As the agency's 
current director Rade Bulatovic, speaking about the new security situation, told the 
media,  
Of course; I would like [reform] to move faster, but unfortunately, Serbia 
does not have time. Our country is facing great challenges, to which the 
Agency must contribute appropriately. I have in mind, primarily, the 
founding of the Serbian State, which is in progress. The National Security 
Agency, such as BIA is, plays a very precise role in this issue, first of all, 
in the domain of information as well as in combating terrorism and 
organized crime.65 
Speaking of the new environment, the current organization of the agency is similar 
to the structure of most western intelligence services. The new structure reflects the new 
tasks and environment for BIA work. The current structure, presented on Figure 3, was 
adopted in November 2006.  
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Figure 3.   Organizational Chart of BIA66  
 
 
   
As shown in Figure 3, the current design of BIA reflects the new internal control 
mechanism put in place with the new legal regulation, the new tasks of service and the 
agency's important role in the fight against terrorism and organized crime.   
According to the law, the internal and budgetary department is responsible for 
internal oversight of the service operations in regard to compliance with the principle of 
the rule of law. Article 16 of the law deals with the overall government institutional 
control and the mechanisms by which this control is exercised.67 
In the area of personnel recruitment, BIA has suffered a lot in the recent years. Of 
course many people do not want to be associated with the service due to its bad image, 
but in 2005 a new recruitment procedure was put in place. Now the old generation 
officers are out. The service welcomes the best students from universities and other state 
institutions. Director Bulatovic mentioned this problem in his interview with Tanug. 
Since for a long time the Service was a closed-entry institution, not all 
citizens of Serbia could get a job in the BIA (RDB) under equal 
conditions. Virtually, this became possible two years ago. [sic] Every 
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citizen of Serbia may get an engagement at the BIA, certainly, in case that, 
one possesses appropriate qualifications; the Agency now welcomes the 
best students from excellent State institutions and universities. [sic] We 
are also more than content with staff we have obtained.  Conditions for the 
formation of the efficient service in democratic European Serbia are being 
provided.68 
It is also important to notice that the open and transparent work of intelligence is a 
two-way street. The society must give the service a chance to do its job and the 
intelligence agencies should in return produce more work more efficiently. One way to 
achieve that is mentioned by Jankovic.  
[T]he Agency’s education system seems overly closed and isolated. That 
could be overcome by a more systematic and increased participation of 
Agency’s members in seminars, courses, workshops and other educational 
activities organized by academic institutions and the NGOs, especially on 
topics such as human rights protection, eradication of corruption, 
promotion of the democratic nature of civil-military relations, etc. The 
expertise and participation of the civil sector in the making of laws, 
strategies and other regulations in the security sphere are necessary if one 
wishes to produce the best legal text and the most widely accepted results. 
Independent analyses of general and specific security challenges should be 
invaluable for the national security service and they are not obtainable by 
operative work or engagement of "collaborators," but rather by 
cooperation. 69 
To summarize this chapter, the trends in security service reform can be evaluated 
as appropriate for integrating Serbia into the NATO PfP program. The achievements of 
government institutions are remarkable.  However, a lot more still needs to be done, as 
the big challenge for the security and intelligence services remains. The challenge is to 
become credible in the eyes of professionals and society and regain their confidence. 
Being part of the Euro-Atlantic Community requires much more flexibility and 
willingness to cooperate with similar services in the region, as well as with former foes 
like the CIA and the western intelligence community.   
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V. PUBLIC ATTITUDES 
Discussions of reforms in the security sector, particularly in the army and security 
services, are meaningless without mention of public opinion.  From a management 
viewpoint, it is very important for a government to have a clear idea of social attitudes 
toward reforms in the most expensive and powerful government institutions, like the 
army and the security services, because the costs are borne by the taxpayers.  
In that sense, Serbia is not a special case. As in other countries, the security sector 
competes with other sectors for state budget funds. On the other hand, the Serbian 
economy has suffered a lot recently. Uncontrollable inflation, economic isolation, and the 
gap between the demand for goods and consumption are just a few examples of the 
difficulties Serbia faces today. For example, the funds available for the army were 
approximately eight percent of the 2004 state budget (about 70 million euros), a large 
percentage in comparison with sectors like health care, education and social services.70 
Society needs to know how this money is spent.  That is why public opinion is a very 
important criteria for the success of government policy in the security sector.  
The discussion in this chapter is based on results from the survey of public 
opinion conducted by the Center of Civil-Military Relations for the period 2003-2005. 
The survey, conducted with UK support, includes questions about the situation with the 
army, the status of military reform, and attitudes towards NATO PfP program 
membership. The survey was conducted quarterly between May 2003 and June 2005.71  
A. PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD REFORMS IN THE ARMY AND THE 
SECURITY SERVICES  
1. The Situation of the Army  
Between 1945 and 1992, the Yugoslavian People's Army (JNA), like every post-
communist conscript army, had a very high rating, as the army was seen as a symbol of 
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state power.  With the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992, the 
army's rating dropped due to the wars between 1992 and 1999. The lowest level of public 
support for the army was expressed after the NATO air campaign in 1999 and the 
military “defeat” in Kosovo.  Since then, the army lost a lot of credibility and at some 
point after 2000 its survival was questionable. Between 2000 and 2003, the army suffered 
because social negligence. Lack of funding, poor social conditions, obsolete military 
equipment, and low morale were frequent problems.  But in 2003, when the State Union 
was formed, people started to pay more attention to its army. Consequently, ratings 
increased because the army was seen as a state institution again. Trust and confidence in 
the army was expressed by more than 60 percent of the respondents in the survey, while 
the government had only 18 percent approval in 2003.72  At the same time, people 
expressed their mistrust and lack of confidence in the Commanders of the army, and the 
Military Security Services Chief had the lowest rating at that time, less than 25 percent, 
as illustrated in Figure 4.  
 




Approximately 66 percent of the people thought that the living conditions of the 
soldiers and officers are unsatisfactory, surprising results considering that the “state” of 
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Serbia and Montenegro itself was not even sure of its own existence.74  It is obvious that 
people were expressing their mistrust in all government institutions because the future of 
the state was unclear. The situation in the army reflected the situation in the state. Now, 
when the state of Serbia is more clearly defined, it can be expected that a new round of 
the same survey would show that the army and government have higher ratings.   
2. Citizens’ Expectations for Military Reform 
Participants in the survey strongly supported the need for reforms. On average, 
35.5 percent support urgent reforms, but the tendency from 2003 to 2005 was for an 
increase in support for reforms. As Milorad Timotic commented, 
This can possibly indicate that amongst the Serbian public the idea is very 
slowly, but surely maturing on the need for respecting human rights in 
principle, and in the army as well….It would now be necessary for the 
Defence Ministry and General Staff to undertake concrete measures that 
would result in better protection of human rights in the Army. 75 
During the initial phase  of the transition period from autocratic rule towards 
democracy (2000-2003), the federal government was obliged to respond to the popular 
will by making efforts to reform the army in utilizing standards such as protection of 
human rights. However, most people did not have adequate trust in government 
institutions as a result of their uncertain performance.   Thus at the end of 2003, people 
believed that the reforms in the army were not so urgent. According to Timotic's 
research, only 23 percent of the responders were “pro” reforms, while in the seventh 
round the supporters of the reforms were about 43 percent.76   That fact demonstrates that 
people started to demand more reform as government institutions were strengthened.  
The same survey found the first two priorities for reform were “democratic 
civilian control over the army and establishing control and restricting military secret 
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services.”77 These were exactly the priorities in government policy and activities between 
2003 and 2005, as described in Chapters II and III.   
In summary, the results from the survey concerning military reform and public 
confidence in institutions show that the public did not much trust government institutions 
between 2003 and 2005. In a relatively steady trend, army reforms were rated the second 
highest priority among the public sectors. People probably were more concerned about 
their standards of living and were more interested in the development of the social sectors 
than the security sector. The same tendency was observed in Bulgaria and Romania, for 
example, during the initial phase of their transition to democracy in the early 1990’s.  But 
in those countries, society gradually expressed more interest and support for security 
sector reforms. After Montenegro independence in 2006, Serbia again had to reorganize 
state institutions and reshape government mechanisms. This time people were much more 
supportive of  government policy, because they were witnessing the continuation of 
military and security services reform despite nation-wide economic difficulties.  In 2006, 
the NATO invitation to join the PfP probably also increased public support.      
B.  PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PFP PROGRAM  
While the government and its institutions receive low ratings in the survey, PfP 
membership is consistently strong support. Surveys show that from May 2003 up to the 
end of the survey in December 2005, between 60 and 70 percent of participants approved 
of Serbia's membership in the PfP program.78 This high level of support is explained by 
the fact that Serbian society witnessed the progress of neighboring countries, like 
Bulgaria and Romania, which were PfP members, then joined NATO and later the 
European Union. This serves as a good example for the Serbian people, who generally 
supported in the government policy of joining PfP and the EU. Timotic also supports this 
interpretation. 
In the seventh round [December 2005], this trend of increase in the 
percent of those that supported joining the PfP was renewed. Differences 
in the last two rounds weren’t very large, and the overall trend and data 
are convincing enough and enable a reliable conclusion that about three-
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fourths of the sample, representing the Serbian public, from round to 
round, steadily supports joining the Partnership for Peace. This fact is of 
exceptional political significance and should be one of the coordinates for 
political parties in defining their position on the Partnership for Peace.79   
 Joining the PfP program was seen by the Serbian public as an option to 
bring peace and stability to the country after the decade of wars, insecurity, fear 
and economic troubles. Essentially, people thought that PfP might at least calm 
and level government policy with modern democratic values. In a war-torn 
society like Serbia after 2000, it is natural that people want peace. That is why, 
according to Timotic, “a little over 50 percent from round to round express 
confidence that PfP would guarantee long lasting peace within the country and 
with its neighbouring countries.”80 
 The survey results show two things. First, Serbian society was ready to 
accept that the country could rely on foreign help and support for its own security 
as a member of programs like PfP. In the context of globalization, this is a 
common security trend.   Second, the PfP initiative has very high ratings and is a 
trusted mechanism for dealing with security problems today. But arguably, the 
Serbian people are not big fans of direct foreign involvement in their national 
security. As Timotic comments,  
[A] little more than 50 percent of the respondents in Serbia and 
Montenegro think that it is not necessary for foreign experts to participate 
in reform of our army.  This point of view is preconditioned by the 
traditional view that our army and defence system must only be in the 
competence of our professionals. Participation of foreigners could also 
violate the classically comprehended secrecy of military affairs and 
defence. However, contemporary integration processes in the field of 
security require more openness and cooperation than in the past. 
Therefore, the public will have to get used to the presence of foreign 
officers and experts in our army, as well as the presence of our military 
representatives in the NATO Headquarters in Brussels.81 
The most interesting fact in the survey is that people who supported PfP 
membership have varying political orientations. Data presented by Atanasovic in 
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“Political Orientation and Citizens’ Views on Military Reforms” includes data 
from members of different parties over the whole political spectrum, ranging from 
the ultra nationalistic Serbian Radical Party, to President Tadic's Democratic 
Party. Of course each expressed different opinions, but all agreed that the  
government reforms were necessary given the country's new status in the PfP.  
Atanasovic says, 
We asked the respondents what, in their opinion, the priorities of military 
reform are.  Modernization of arms and equipment is a highly ranked 
priority for PSS supporters (76.2 percent), SPS (73.5 percent), and SRS 
(68.3 percent). Improving the economic position of the army is very 
important for SPS (62 percent) and SRS (60 percent) supporters, while it 
attracts the attention of DS supporters to a lesser extent (28.6 percent). 
Professionalization of the Army has taken one of the first three places on 
the list of priorities of reform amongst supporters of all political parties. 
This option is supported by two-thirds of the DS supporters, about half of 
the DSS supporters and close to two thirds of the SRS and SPS 
supporters.  Establishing democratic civilian control over the army and 
restricting the power of secret services as a priority does not draw a large 
percent of respondents, but it is more significant amongst DS supporters 
(26.9 percent). A smaller percent of SRS supporters (7.8 percent) and SPS 
supporters (4.9) recognize the need to establish democratic civilian control 
over the Army and restrict the power of secret services as a priority in 
reforming the Army.82 
In summary, data presented in this chapter show that in general, the public 
attitude toward military and security services reforms is positive, and public opinion is 
more than supportive for Serbian participation in the PfP program.  
No matter the political and economic differences in Serbian society, overall public 
opinion is united in regard to the future of Serbia. The survey shows that without a doubt, 
people want a modern democratic Serbia accepted in the international arena. This is why 
Serb society will support any reasonable government policy to insure the country's Euro-
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Today the army and the state security services are undergoing serious reforms. 
The ultimate goal of this process, as described in Chapters III and IV, is to bringing these 
state institutions closer to NATO PfP objectives and standards.  To this end, several 
government institutions have tried for more than five years to define and implement an 
appropriate state security policy to achieve the goal of PfP membership. Finally the 
government succeeded.   
Progress so far is remarkable and deserves to be acknowledged. However, more 
work lies ahead, to enhance the achievement and fully integrate the country into NATO's 
PfP program. This chapter summarizes the findings of the thesis and evaluates the state 
security policy of Serbia.   




Table 1.    Status of the State Security Policy in Regard to Membership in PfP  
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To improve the national 
security environment, Serbian 
institutions have acted to craft 
appropriate laws, enabling 
adequate reforms in the military 
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recognized standards, like 
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As Table 1 shows, future Serbian governments have a lot to do. The areas of 
cooperation under NATO's PfP program include many areas for improvement.  The best 
possible solution for Serbia is to incorporate all of the areas into the Individual PfP 
program.   
The adaptation of the current Serbian State Security Policy can be executed with 
support of NATO experts who have worked for years with Serbian officials. The NATO 
liaison office in Belgrade can provide the necessary expertise to craft the new phase of 
army reform and to update of existing laws in accordance with PfP documents and 
standards.   
Under PfP, Serbian military and intelligence officers will have bilateral or 
multilateral access to other countries' educational and training institutions. The most 
important areas for education and training include civil-military relations, military 
professional development, defense planning and budgeting, and modern military 
operations such as peace keeping operations, crisis response operations and military 
operations in support of humanitarian assistance. 
Counterterrorism operations and operations against organized crime, of major 
importance today, are areas where the Serbian military and security services can 
contribute a lot.     
 Public opinion so far favors of government actions and activities. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, people with different political orientations so far support 
government policy towards NATO and PfP. Since the people pay the bill, it will be 
necessary for the government to involve the public more frequently in disputes and 
decisions about military and security service reforms. 
 The society itself needs to develop more mechanisms for putting pressure on the 
controllers of the military and security service in order to ensure compliance with the 
democratic values espoused in the new constitution.   
 Last but not least, the society and government should to encourage “zero-
tolerance” for those who committed war crimes and their supporters who abused their 




These findings can be implemented as part of the Serbian individual partnership 
program with NATO, as was done by all other NATO PFP member countries. On that 
point, the author offers the following recommendations on state security policy.  
• There is so far no alternative to the integration into PfP and later into the 
EU. No matter what its political orientation, the government must 
cooperate with society and opposition parties to continue the process. 
• The legal progress made under the State Union should be maintained. 
Several draft laws which were developed but not adopted should be 
updated and brought before the new parliament as soon as possible. 
• Military reforms are good example of the will to modernize an old 
organization with limited funds. This good practice can be generalized to 
other government institutions. 
• As soon as the new government is in place, the working program or action 
plan for reforms in the security sector should be crafted and brought to a 
vote in the parliament. 
• Discussion of the new national security strategy should be initiated and 
presented openly to parliament and society. Upon approval, documents 
concerning defense doctrine, security policy, etc. should be developed or 
updated.  
• The media, nongovernmental organizations and foreign advisors have 
important roles in shaping state security policy. Thus the government 
should encourage a more transparent and critical attitude toward national 
security.   
• Good relations in recent years between Serbia and NATO should be 
extended from the political level to the level of working experts. 
• In order to overcome the negative heritage from Milosevic era, the 
government should be more active in cooperating with the International 




• The government of Serbia should also work to create a positive image of 
the country as a trusted partner to other PfP countries by acting effectively 
to implement state security policy in compliance with the spirit and 
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